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Make or Buy in a mature industry?  
Models of client-supplier relationships under TCT and RBV 
perspectives 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we use the transaction cost theory (TCT) and the resource-
based view (RBV) to discuss three propositions on the models of client-
supplier relationships in mature industries. The two theories seem to 
advance different organizational forms of the client-supplier relationships, 
and in some instances contradictory. How should firms organize to prosper 
and grow, namely in the international markets? Through the case study of 
three Portuguese packaging firms, with primary (interviews) and secondary 
data, we discuss how the three firms deploy three distinct strategic 
organization models in a mature industry. One firm utilizes market-based 
governance mechanisms, and concentrates its production in a few selected 
locations. Another firm vertically integrates almost the entire value chain of 
the product to provide full service to its clients. The third firm operates in a 
model of integrated outsourcing, with the installation "wall to wall" to its 
clients. The models client-supplier assumed by these firms are based on 
efficient, stable, and trustworthy relationships, that permit the focus on 
their core competences and the reduction of the transaction costs. Firms’ 
superior performance requires a proper alignment of hierarchical and 
relational governance taking in consideration the dimensions of the 
transactions. 
 
Keywords: Client-supplier relationship models; Outsourcing; TCT; RBV; 
Strategic Governance 
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INTRODUCTION 
What should firms do in mature industries? Should they make, or 
should they buy? How do firms in mature industries design the organization 
models for client-supplier exchanges? These questions have been debated 
in organization and strategic management research as the dichotomy 
‘make’ or ‘buy’. This dichotomy can be traced back to the logic of economic 
rationale proposed by Adam Smith (1776, p. 759) as "it is the maximum of 
every prudent master of the family, never to attempt to make at home what 
it will cost him more to make than to buy", or to the work of Coase (1937) 
on the nature of the firm. Coase (1937) stated that firms that decide to 
internalize the allocation of resources, and substitute the market-based 
mechanisms, exist because the transaction costs are high. The essence of 
Coase’s thought is that firms and markets are alternative forms of 
organization for managing the same transactions. Whether a firm makes or 
buys is largely a function of the transaction costs of managing the 
exchanges inside the firm, as compared with mediating the transaction 
through the market (Williamson, 1975, 1985).  
However, despite the extant research, the dilemma whether to make 
or to buy is still current, is transversal to multiple industries and 
organizations, and is far from being resolved (Leiblein, Reuer & Dalsace, 
2002; Parmigiani, 2007; Hätönen & Eriksson, 2009). Furthermore, this 
dilemma has rarely been subjected to questioning in mature industries. In 
emergent industries firms may need to internalize more activities of the 
product value chain to overcome a multitude of market imperfections. 
Conversely, in mature industries it is likely that outsourcing relationships 
dominate as firms seek to concentrate on their competencies (Hamel & 
Prahalad, 1990), and avoid committing to investments in fixed assets in non 
core activities. In particular, it seems reasonable to suggest that in mature 
industries outsourcing relationships may be highly calculative (Hite & 
Hesterly, 2001) and unstable, and thus at least proximate to buy off-the-
shelf behaviors.  
Despite the extensive scholarly conversation on the theory of the firm, 
remains a lack of consensus on the conditions that define the firms’ 
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boundaries (Jacobides & Billinger, 2006). Recent research has suggested 
that firms benefit from focusing on their core competences (Hamel & 
Prahalad, 1990). These are the activities in which firms create value added 
and allow the generation of above normal returns (Mahoney & Pandian, 
1992; Peteraf, 1993). Therefore, only these activities should be internalized 
within the boundaries of the firms, and the remaining operations should be 
contracted in the market (Coase, 1937). Williamson (1975, 1985) argued 
for the importance of aligning governance structures with transactions, and 
the selection of the best-tailored organization model for each transaction. 
Other scholars argued that only activities where the firms use their 
valuable, rare, non-imitable, and non-substitutable (VRIN) resources 
sustain a competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Chaharbaghi & Lynch, 
1999) and should be carried in-house. In actuality, while some firms 
increasingly transact with the market, other firms internalize activities they 
previously outsourced. Furthermore, the dichotomy ‘make’ or ‘buy’ may be 
overcome with entirely new governance models (see also Powell, 1990; 
Williamson, 1985) leading Kogut et al. (1992) to suggest that the dilemma 
is not whether to make or to buy but rather whether to make or to 
cooperate (see also Gulati, 1995, 1998; Jacobides & Billinger, 2006; 
Geyskens, Steemkamp & Kumar, 2006), or perhaps assume some other 
hybrid organization form. 
In mature industries, it may be that the choice of governance form is 
facilitated. Mature industries tend to have many characteristics that tend to 
lower market imperfections and transaction hazards. For example, mature 
industries are typically populated by efficient competing firms, mitigating 
small numbers bargaining and the potential for opportunistic behaviours 
(Williamson, 1985). Mature industries also tend to have well developed 
institutions that monitor market performance. In addition, in mature 
industries, competitive advantages generally do not reside on the control of 
the manufacturing process, or tangible resources (Barney, 1991), rather 
they tend to be based on the possession of unique firm-specific knowledge 
(Grant, 1996; Hoopes, Madsen & Walker, 2003), or manufacturing 
efficiency (Vernon, 1966). And, finally, it is more likely that firms in mature 
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industries are better able to reduce the transaction costs in the interfaces 
with their clients. 
In this study we analyze the client-supplier models selected by three 
firms in the same (albeit heterogeneous) industry, and contrast them using 
the suggestions of two main research streams. Our research question thus 
focuses on how do firms in a mature industry organize their client-supplier 
exchanges and whether the transaction costs or the resources held sustain 
the organizational form adopted. The literature review highlights potential 
tensions between the transaction costs theory (TCT) and the resource based 
view (RBV). In an nutshell, the TCT suggests the internalization of activities 
whenever the costs and risks of outsourcing are high and some conditions 
apply, while the RBV advises the internalization when the strategic 
importance of the activities is high and the firm holds appropriate 
resources. While one theory focuses on the transaction, the other focuses 
on the resources held. That is not to say that the theories “predictions” as 
to the models adopted are always different, as we examine. We also explore 
the extent to which an heterogeneous product, different efficient scales, 
diverse investment requirements in fixed assets, varied transportation 
costs, and the frequency of the interaction client-supplier, influence the 
organization model of these firms. Our exploration goes beyond the TCT or 
RBV prescriptions to note that the theories do not provide a unique and 
unified framework for the analysis of how firms organize the exchanges with 
their clients to survive and prosper. The issue is contemporary as the large 
multinational corporations look for manners to become ever more efficient 
namely by seeking out partnerships for their activities; and particularly 
those activities that are not related to their core business.  
This paper is organized in three main sections. In the first section, we 
briefly discuss the theoretical background and formulate three basic 
propositions based on insights from transaction costs and the resource-
based view in the context of mature industries. The analysis of the case 
studies, in the second section, synthesizes a description of the three firms 
studied, and the factors assessed to have a more significant impact on the 
governance models selected by the focal firms. Finally, the discussion is 
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based on the analysis of the cases, presents limitations and suggests 
avenues for future research. 
SELECTING FROM THE ORGANIZATIONAL MENU IN MATURE 
INDUSTRIES 
Strategic management research conveys several largely disparate 
perspectives to boundary and inter-firm organization management. For 
example, transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975, 1985) 
examines the relative efficiency of alternative governance models. The 
central issue in transaction cost theory is whether a transaction is more 
efficiently performed within the firm (leading to vertical integration) or 
outside it (and hence contracted to independent vendors - market 
governance). The resource based view (RBV) observes the firms’ boundaries 
supported by valuable, rare, non-imitable, non-substitutable tangible and 
intangible resources that have the potential to generate abnormal returns 
(Barney, 1991; Hoopes et al., 2003). This section briefly reviews these two 
streams of research in the context of mature industries leading to the 
formulation of three propositions on the design of inter-firm organizational 
models in mature industries. These propositions will be subsequently 
discussed utilizing three cases of Portuguese packaging firms.  
In the recent decades we have been assisting to an outsourcing 
revolution, changing the way firms compete, the activities they carry in-
house and how they invest in resource exploration and in their relationships 
with other firms (Corbett, 2004). This is happening across industries, from 
the automobile, aerospace, telecommunications, computers, 
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, healthcare, financial services and software 
industries (Carson, 2007; Dahan & Hauser, 2002; Quinn, 2000). 
Outsourcing is the transfer of activities and processes previously conducted 
internally inside the firm to an external party (Ellram & Billington, 2001). Fill 
and Visser (2000) refer to outsourcing as the most sustained trend in 
business and it comes in contrast to the traditional model whereby firms 
used to be highly vertically integrated and the activities in every link of the 
value chain were conducted internally.  
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The success of early outsourcing experiences generated bandwagon 
effects and many other firms started experimenting. Outsourcing promised 
it was possible to follow Hamel and Prahalad’s (1990) rationale of focusing 
on the core competences of the corporation, if firms outsourced activities 
that were not in their area of expertise and that were not os strategic 
importance to compete in the market. Outsourcing permitted benefits 
beyond the cost efficiency, such as to access skills, knowledge and 
processes they did not held. Eventually, the “strategic outsourcing” models 
emerged (Quinn & Hilmer, 1994) as firms understood the benefits of 
establishing closer, and more stable relationships with their suppliers and 
clients. As the world became more interconnected, firms had global access 
to vendors, the costs of interacting decreased and the communication and 
information technologies improved, firms could rethink the boundaries of 
their businesses (Doig et al., 2001). 
Mature Industries 
Although the majority of the firms operate in mature industries there is 
noticeably scant research examining how firms compete in mature 
industries. However, it is well established that firms adjust their strategies 
to the life cycle of the industry (Porter, 1980; Bush & Sinclair, 1992). For 
instance, in emerging industries firms seem to compete to define standards 
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986), speed to place innovations in the market 
(Schoonoven, Eisenhardt & Lyman, 1990), and to differentiate from 
competitors (Porter, 1980). Conversely, in mature industries, cost-based 
strategies seem to predominate (Porter, 1980) as products become harder 
to differentiate and firms seek ways to increase manufacturing efficiency. 
However, this characterization may be incomplete because firms need to 
adjust to changes in the industry’s structure and in the nature of 
competition. In addition, firms also need to adjust to the clients’ response 
to their own industry’s changes (Bush & Sinclair, 1992). For instance, the 
self-production of metallic packaging by the US producers, declined from 
54% in 1985 to a mere 19% in 1996 (The Canmaker, July 1997). The US 
producers used to manufacture their own containers, but they are 
increasingly outsourcing the manufacture of the containers to external 
efficient suppliers. For small and medium sized packaging manufacturers 
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worldwide this trend towards outsourcing represents an opportunity to 
survive and expand. It is important to present at the outset what is meant 
here with outsourcing. Firms outsource when they contract the realization of 
one activity in the value chain, or the entire chain of activities to an outside 
firm.  
In mature industries, holding a competitive advantage does not rely on 
the control of the manufacturing process, rather firms are more likely to 
sustain their competitive positions by controlling intangible assets (e.g., 
knowledge) embedded in the products, and on customer-oriented strategies 
(Porter, 1980; Bush & Sinclair, 1992; Carson, 2007). For example, Nike, 
Inc. internalized the extremes of the value chain (R&D and marketing - 
where intangible resources are more pronounced) and outsourced the 
manufacturing process to independent suppliers. Multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) seem to be major drivers of this shift towards outsourcing in mature 
industries because globalization forces MNEs to redefine the boundaries of 
their relationships with clients, suppliers and competitors (see Hätönen & 
Eriksson, 2009). This change is attributed to macro factors such as the 
trend towards diminishing transport costs, the decrease in tariff barriers to 
international trade, the gradual elimination of bureaucratic and 
administrative barriers (Dunning, 1995), and the reduction of transaction 
costs driven by advances in communications (Doig et al., 2001). A visible 
outcome of these changes is that MNEs are rationalizing their production, 
particularly in undifferentiated product segments, through the concentration 
of manufacturing in a small number of locations and serving a larger market 
base from these central points. This has occurred massively in the European 
Union (EU) during the past two decades. This means that some MNEs as 
well as domestic firms gradually disintegrate and seek relational forms of 
outsourcing rather than seeking to maintain in-house a variety of activities. 
In proposition form, we may thus formulate a general proposition based on 
received wisdom: 
Proposition 1. Firms in mature industries are more likely to use 
outsourcing models than maintaining activities in-house. 
In mature industries, given the pressure towards cost efficiency, it 
would seem reasonable to suggest that outsourcing relationships would 
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tend to be unstable. Competition in mature industries is stereotypically 
based on achieving the lowest possible cost (Porter, 1980) which is better 
attained if firms resort to spot transactions (or buy off-the-shelf 
contracting), and maintain arm’s length relations. That is, the lowest cost is 
obtained when firms arbitrage between suppliers in an attempt to obtain the 
lowest bid for their order. In this case market-based exchanges are 
unstable, calculative, and opportunistic, but they also show firms resorting 
to the pure market to obtain the inputs needed. 
Transaction Costs Theory 
Transaction costs theory (TCT) is often used to explain the decision to 
internalize or externalize activities (Jacobides, 2004; Geyskens et al., 2006; 
Mayer & Salomon, 2006). TCT seeks to explain why firms exist, and why 
firms do what they do, or why they don’t do what they don’t do (Madhok, 
2002). Given the neoclassical assumptions of perfect markets, atomistic 
agents, perfect flows of information, we may reiterate Coase’s (1937) and 
Williamson’s (1975, 1985) concerns: why are not all transactions organized 
through the market, and instead some transactions are organized inside 
firms? Thus far, scholars seem to agree that the choice of governance 
model is supported on the analysis of the relative costs and benefits of each 
governance form and on the transaction costs involved in the exchanges. 
The fact is that according to Coase (1937) under some conditions, 
exchanges are not efficiently organized using markets and require 
internalization. The state of maturity of the industry is likely to change the 
relative impact of the transaction costs in client-supplier exchanges.  
According to Williamson (1985) firms’ will internalize activities, rather 
than resort to external suppliers if three conditions are verified. First, if the 
degree of uncertainty involved in the transaction is high. Uncertainty is 
manifested in the agents’ bounded rationality that originates incomplete 
contracts due to the difficulty (or impossibility) of foreseeing all possible 
future situations in the contracting moment, and the potential for 
opportunistic behaviors (Kale, Singh & Perlmutter, 2000) when one of the 
partners pursues his own self-interest. Without uncertainty bounded 
rationality would be irrelevant (Barney & Hesterly, 1996). Second, if the tie-
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in nature of the investments in fixed assets specific to a relation is high. 
Specific assets to a relation may have no value for other relationships and 
thus the party that makes asset-specific investments may be held-up in 
opportunistic behaviors by the partner (Kale et al., 2000; Dyer & Chu, 
2003). Therefore, when the exchange requires investments in assets 
specific to the exchange the focal firm may opt to internalize the exchange 
to reduce transaction costs. Third, if the firm has to buy recurrently from 
the suppliers. Recurrent transactions may be better carried out internally in 
the firm (e.g., vertical integration) rather than in the market (outsourcing) 
under conditions of uncertainty and potential opportunism.  
In mature industries the market tends to be efficient and it would 
seem reasonable that firms would outsource virtually all operations. This is 
partly because there are alternative efficient suppliers with the necessary 
equipment and skills to carry out the activity, therefore reducing their 
bargaining power, and the likelihood they will engage in opportunistic 
behaviors. Conversely, it is also reasonable to suggest that it is when the 
industry is emerging or in a growth stage that firms would benefit from 
vertically integrating. Vertical integration permits firms to overcome 
multiple market imperfections, and vertical integration is a plausible 
organizational form for the reduction of transaction costs, elimination of 
supply uncertainties, creation of barriers to entry, and, in selected cases, 
for maintaining flexibility to market changes (Porter, 1980; Williamson, 
1985). Hence, under a transaction costs perspective, bounded rationality, 
opportunism, asset specificity, uncertainty and recurrence of the 
transactions will converge to determine which transactions are internalized 
and which are conducted via the market (Williamson, 1985; Barney & 
Hesterly, 1996). The general prediction of the TCT is that firms should be 
performing in-house activities that have high transaction hazards. Hence, in 
proposition form: 
Proposition 2. Firms in mature industries are more likely to outsource 
activities when transaction hazards are low than when these hazards 
are high.  
In sum, the TCT suggests that firms should internalize activities when 
the transactional hazards are high, regardless of the strategic importance of 
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the focal activity, and externalize (or outsource) when these hazards are 
low. However, this answer provides only a partial view because the relative 
stability of the outsourcing relationship will likely be influenced by the 
strategic importance of the activity, thus contributing to lower or heighten 
the transaction costs involved. For example, activities of low strategic 
importance may be carried out through unstable relationships - i.e., 
relationships that are redesigned after each exchange. Conversely, activities 
of high strategic importance may require stable relationships to prevent 
unintended spillovers of the knowledge shared, and to promote cooperation 
in such activities as product innovation (Carson, 2007). The RBV reviewed 
below is complementary to the TCT in providing explanations to the 
organization of inter-firm exchanges. 
Resource Based Models 
The RBV focuses on firms’ internal organization and resources to 
understand how firms achieve a sustainable competitive advantage. The 
RBV is used to assess the strategic resources available to a firm and its 
basic tenet is that the basis for a firm’s competitive advantage lie on how 
the firm applies the bundle of valuable resources it holds (Wernerfelt, 
1984). The firm has a sustained competitive advantage when these 
resources are heterogeneous in nature and not perfectly mobile (Barney, 
1991; Peteraf, 1993; Hoppes et al., 2003). The RBV argues that the sources 
of value creation lie in a few valuable, rare, non-imitable, and non-
substitutable resources (Barney, 1991, 1999; Hopes et al., 2003). These 
resources develop in an evolutionary learning process in a path dependent 
manner shaped by firm-specific histories (Dierrickx & Cool, 1989), and 
determine the set of activities in which firms are involved (Wernerfelt, 
1984; Barney, 1999). Resources may be virtually any factor – all assets, 
knowledge, processes or organizational characteristics - that is specific and 
controlled by the firm (Barney, 1991). Mascarenhas, Baveja and Jamil 
(1998), for example, concluded that successful firms rely on three types of 
competencies: superior technological know how, reliable processes, and 
close external relationships. Superior resources allow firms to generate 
above normal rents (Peteraf, 1993).  
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According to the RBV firms’ competitive advantage is essentially 
endogenous. Managers will be interested in controlling the resources that 
are likely to lead to higher value added and that may expand the set of 
market opportunities. Thus, in a RBV perspective, firms expand towards 
similar activities, or activities that require a similar set of resources, 
routines and skills (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Argyres, 1996), or technologies. 
In partial opposition to the TCT the RBV seemingly advises not to outsource 
those activities where the firm has a superior competitive advantage or 
those activities that have a significant leverage potential (Porter, 1980; 
Jacobides, 2004). 
According to the RBV there are some resources that may lead to a 
superior performance and probably to a sustained competitive advantage. 
Sustainability is a function of the ease to imitate by competitors, but it is 
also determined by whether they are adequate for the future market 
requirement, given the usual volatility of the markets and changes in 
competition. Hence, firms need to revitalize and develop new resources 
focusing on its readiness for the future market conditions. That is to say 
that firms need to be simultaneously engaged in exploiting their current 
resource endowment but also engaged in new resource development 
(Chaharbaghi & Lynch 1999). Danny Miller’s (2003) study showed how 
some of them were able to build not so much on resources and capabilities 
as on asymmetries. Asymmetries are typically skills, processes, or assets a 
firm’s competitors do not and cannot copy at a cost that affords economic 
rents. In sum, not only firms vary in their current resource endowments, 
but also on the path taken to explore new resources, both contributing to 
the larger heterogeneity among firms (Hoopes et al., 2003) and 
conditioning the manner in which they compete and the extent to which 
they differ. In addition, the RBV emphasizes the role of the Executive and of 
strategic choice given the importance of identifying, developing and 
deploying key resources to maximize performance, which also entails 
decisions on what to do and what not to do. 
Firms in mature industries are more likely to compete on the basis of 
their intangible resources such as brand names, or knowledge (e.g., Grant, 
1991, 1996; Liebeskind, 1996), than on their tangible resources. Tangible 
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resources are more easily imitated and rents from these resources are not 
easily appropriated. Therefore, firms may outsource to external firms 
activities that involve tangible resources, particularly when developing these 
resources internally is not likely to be a source of future competitive 
advantage, and hence are of low strategic importance. Specifically, it is 
probable that some form of tacit knowledge resides on the core of firms’ 
competitiveness because tacit knowledge is sticky and cannot be easily 
transferred (Grant, 1996; Szulanski, 1996). Thus, firms may be more 
efficient than markets to govern exchanges that involve tacit knowledge, 
but the explicit knowledge is easily transferred with low marginal costs and 
therefore it is easily exchanged through outsourcing relationships. In 
addition, knowledge will likely be less sticky (Szulanski, 1996) in mature 
industries because the impediments to knowledge flow are minimized. In 
mature industries, dominant designs and standards are established, and 
firms have an architectural understanding of the interconnections between 
knowledge bits (or components) (Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Tallman et 
al., 2004). Firms’ boundaries and inter-firm governance models are then 
determined by firms’ ability to exploit resources outside traditional 
technological and/or organizational boundaries. Mature industries are 
characterized by low transaction hazards, as described previously, but the 
strategic importance of the activity, and not the potential transactional 
hazards, is likely to determine the client-supplier organizational model 
selected. Specifically, in a RBV rationale, firms are more likely to outsource 
activities that are of low strategic importance and not based on the actual 
resource pool held by the firm. 
Proposition 3. Firms in mature industries will be more likely to outsource 
activities that have lower strategic importance and the firms do not have a 
specific advantage in performing the activity, an to insource activities that 
have a higher strategic importance and the firms hold superior resources to 
perform them.  
To conclude, the above literature review highlights possible tensions. 
Transaction costs theory recommends internalization when the risks and 
costs of contracting in the market are high, the transaction is of the 
recurrent type and there is potential for opportunistic behaviors. This is, for 
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example, the case when assets are highly specific to an outsourcing 
collaboration. Conversely, the RBV confines its suggestion to the 
internalization of activities for which the firms possess the valuable, rare, 
non-imitable, and non-substitutable resources required and to activities that 
are of high strategic importance. This can be more clearly represented in 
the following Figure 1. Hence, TCT and RBV only advance the same 
prediction when the governance hazards are low and the strategic 
importance is low (bottom left quadrant) and when both the strategic 
importance and the governance hazards are particularly high (upper right 
quadrant).  
 
Figure 1 – Comparing the theories 
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   Source: Analysis of the authors. 
 
METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
Case studies may focus on single or multiple cases (Ellram, 1996; Yin, 
1994), and be used with an array of objectives: descriptive, theory testing 
or theory generation (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Rodgers, 2001). The 
three focal cases seek to examine how firms act and contrast them with the 
theories, rather than to generate new theories. We followed the 
methodology proposed by Yin (1984): (a) the selection, description, and 
conceptualization of the study object, (b) the alternative explanations for 
the facts observed, and (c) the discussion and conclusions based on the 
explanations that seem more coherent with the facts. The collection of 
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firms’ specific information involved primary (i.e., interviews in loco with 
owners and Top Managers) and secondary sources (e.g., company reports, 
industry outlooks, news in the media). The research procedure is consistent 
with Eisenhardt (1989) on case studies data gathering that may involve 
archives, interviews, questionnaires and observations. The interviews were 
unstructured and conversational. We sought to understand the firms’ 
decisions and strategic intents in what concerned the relationships with 
their suppliers, the competitive environment, and the growth strategies of 
the three focal firms. Although the packaging industry comprises firms 
whose products are made of paper/carton, glass, metal and plastic, firms in 
this industry reveal high competitiveness and very different client-supplier 
models.  
It is worth pointing out that at the time the data was collected the 
three firms were facing the need to keep their records private avoiding 
disclosure of information. It suffices to note that one of the firms is still 
family-owned, albeit being a large firm, one was subject to a management 
buy out, and the third was acquired by the largest Portuguese 
conglomerate. The latter two within about one year after this study. 
CASE STUDIES 
The Companies. Barbosa & Almeida (B&A) is a glass-packaging 
manufacturer. Founded in 1912, as a "satellite" of the Portuguese national 
brewing company, B&A throve for continuous technological modernizations. 
In an oligopolistic reaction to foreign competitor’s entry in the domestic 
market (Knickerbocker, 1973), in 1993 B&A engaged in an international 
strategy with the acquisition of a company oriented to foreign markets. In 
1996 B&A acquired two other manufacturing plants in Mozambique and in 
1999 a Greenfield investment in the Spanish Extremadura. Presently, B&A 
is investing in North Africa, sells abroad more than 50% of its production, 
and manufactures in foreign countries about one third of its production. 
COLEP is a manufacturer of metallic packaging, founded in 1965. Over 
the years COLEP has been gradually vertically integrating all the activities of 
the value chain from the cut of the metallic leaf, typography, manufacture 
of several components (plastic and metallic), production of packaging 
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(plastic and metallic), formulation and filling of containers, and distribution 
in the Iberia. COLEP is a contract manufacturer for some clients, particularly 
the large multinational firms such as Johnson Wax or Colgate, but for other 
clients it only manufactures the cans. In 1993 COLEP acquired a 
manufacturing unit in Spain, and in 1999 completed a Greenfield 
investment in Poland. COLEP is one of the largest contract fillers in Europe.  
Logoplaste is a producer of plastic packaging, founded in 1976 from 
the revolutionary idea of creating small packaging factories in the client’s 
facilities. Currently, Logoplaste has over 30 manufacturing units - or 
Integrated Production Units (IPU) - in Portugal, Spain, France, U.K. and 
Brazil. Logoplaste is one of the largest European plastic packaging 
producers.  
The Models. The client-supplier organizational models assumed by 
the three firms are deeply differentiated, as illustrated in Figure 2. B&A 
assumes a classic model of centralization of production in large factories 
from where B&A serves its clients through almost pure market relationships. 
The manufacturing of glass containers requires the production of large 
batches of uniform products (high minimum efficient scale) to minimize the 
unitary production costs, and is only viable for large scale enterprises. B&A 
is seemingly a classical example of a large supplier in a mature industry 
supplying a product that is difficult to differentiate.  
COLEP shows a level of high vertical integration to respond to the full 
outsourcing of the clients’ manufacturing activities. COLEP lowers the 
minimum efficient scale (MES) by integrating the different stages of the 
value chain, although it is evident that the upstream activities have higher 
minimum efficient scales than downstream activities. By internationalizing 
the production of contract filling to Spain and Poland, COLEP sought 
coordination advantages that permits maximizing the utilization of the 
production capacity of adjacent integrated activities. This strategy led 
COLEP to internationalize the highest value added activity: the contract 
filling operation. The model assumed by COLEP supports an intermediate 
degree of dispersion but with some degree of coordination among factories. 
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Figure 2 – The models adopted 
 
Low
High
Low
High
Concentration
of production
B&A 
Intermediate
COLEP
Adaptation to the Client
Multi-location
Logoplaste
M
in
im
um
 
Ef
fic
ie
nt
 S
ca
le
M
in
im
um
 
Ef
fic
ie
nt
 S
ca
le
 Source: Analysis of the authors. 
 
Logoplaste developed a model of integration "wall to wall" with the 
clients’ productive structure at a level of almost vertical integration. 
Logoplaste’s model seems to accrue from two main factors: (a) the 
relatively lower minimum efficient scale of plastic containers when 
compared to the manufacturing scales required by metallic or glass 
packaging manufacturers, and (b) higher transport cost of empty bottles 
(despite the low weight of the plastic containers, they occupy large 
volume). Logoplaste’s model of multi-location is possible due to the low 
manufacturing scale needed by each factory. In fact, each factory is 
designed to serve exclusively one customer and the firm is able to project 
factories that are profitable and highly efficient even at low levels of 
production. Each of Logoplaste’s subsidiaries has a distinct minimum 
efficient scale, designed to the specific needs of each client. Hence, for 
Logoplaste, the specificity and nature of the product associated with the 
relatively small MES, renders investment in new factories as the most 
rational mode for both domestic and cross-border expansion. 
Transaction Costs. The transaction costs incurred by the clients of 
the three firms are low. The transaction costs are composed of several 
items. First, it is not feasible for any of the three firms to integrate the 
downstream producers of the manufactured goods (wine, beer, preserves, 
diary products, motor oil, and so forth). That is, it is not reasonable that the 
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packaging firms would integrate vertically downwards into clients. Second, 
the existence of alternative efficient packaging manufacturers guarantees 
that all three firms maintain competitive prices. It is which is typical of 
mature industries the existence of efficient and quality alternative suppliers, 
that maintains the bargaining power of the suppliers reasonably low.  
Third, exchanges with these three firms render unnecessary multiple 
market recruiting and reduce supply uncertainty. For example, B&A supplies 
a large scope of products and the clients do not need to contract different 
bottle formats to different suppliers. COLEP offers a full service (from the 
manufacturing of the container, contract filling, and distribution) that also 
renders unnecessary multiple market transactions with different suppliers. 
Finally, each of Logoplaste’s subsidiaries is tailor made to the needs of its 
clients. Logosplaste’s model not only eliminates supply uncertainty, 
recruiting and contracting with other suppliers, but also increases 
communication and information flows, is transparent, and increases the 
joint innovative potential. 
Fourth, we observe that the client-supplier exchanges require very 
limited asset specificity, although in varied degree, but it does not seem to 
justify per se different organization models. In the case of glass packaging, 
asset specificity is only in terms of the mould, which needs to be adapted to 
the specific shape of the container, be it a specific shape of bottle or other 
type of glass container. In the case of COLEP’s metal containers, asset 
specificity is even lower, and the complete manufacturing process is 
completely adjustable without any significant cost increase to the needs of 
the clients. Only in the case of Logoplaste we see a model that is supported 
on absolute assets’ specificity attached to each project. Logoplaste’s asset 
specificity is technical, location, dedicated assets, and human (employees) 
(see Williamson, 1985). However, in this case, the high asset specificity is 
stabilized by a detailed contract between Logoplaste and each client. 
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Table 1 – Comparison of the three firms 
  Assets’ 
Specificity 
Minimum 
Efficient 
Scale 
Number 
of 
Clients 
Size of  
the 
Batches 
Stability of 
the 
Relations 
B & A Low High High (a) High Medium 
COLEP Medium Medium Low Low/Medium High 
Logoplaste High Low/medium One (b) Medium High 
(a) One client per IPU. 
     (b) B&A maintains about 300 active molds. 
Source: analysis of the authors, based on company information. 
 
Finally, the relationships established with the customers throughout 
the years transmit trust and stability to the relations, and mitigate potential 
opportunistic behaviors. Interestingly, the three firms work within 
polygamous relationships (Jones, Hesterly & Borgati, 1997) - that is, they 
cooperate with rival clients of whom they hold specific knowledge. For 
instance, the innovations originated in a relationship with a client could be 
passed on to other clients. We observed the fundamentally polygamous 
character of COLEP’s ties, in that the partnership COLEP-Johnson Wax 
coexists with COLEP’s contract manufacturing for Johnson Wax’s rivals. We 
found a similar situation in Logoplaste’s supply of rival companies (e.g., 
dairy products, vegetable oil) over which Logoplaste has privileged 
information. Ceteris paribus, this could indicate potential transaction 
hazards.  
The trust and cooperativeness that is developed over repeated 
exchanges tends to lower the perceived transactional hazards (Mollering, 
2002; Dyer & Chu, 2003). For example, the durable relationships between 
COLEP and its customers (some for more than 30 years) induce low 
transaction costs, increase familiarity and trust (Gulati, 1995). COLEP’s high 
level of vertical integration allows it to assume the full outsourcing of its 
clients needs. Consider the case, for instance, of the relation between 
COLEP and Johnson Wax, where Johnson Wax takes responsibility for the 
extremes of the product value chain, but outsources the entire manufacture 
of selected product segments. For these segments, COLEP is entrusted with 
the chemical formula of the products for contract filling, which requires that 
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COLEP is able to carry in-house all the manufacturing stages for those 
products.  
COLEP could be tempted to behave opportunistically but opportunistic 
behaviors are not foreseeable. For instance, the COLEP could behave 
opportunistically and release identical products under COLEP’s own brand, 
since the customers entrust COLEP with the chemical formula for the 
contract filling segments (e.g., shaving cream). However, there is virtually 
no risk associated with the dissipation of knowledge. In part, the clients 
protect themselves by outsourcing the contract filling, or more broadly the 
contract manufacturing, of products in the maturity or decline stage of their 
life cycles – for which the control of the manufacturing process is no longer 
critical.  
A diverse situation may be described for Logoplaste. The potential of 
opportunistic behaviors by Logoplaste is lessened by its interest on spatial 
and inter-temporal relationships (same customer in several locations). 
Logoplaste’s model evidences a form of integrated exchanges supplier-
customer that resembles an insourcing solution and is based on absolute 
trust of its clients. Logoplaste has an almost absolute linkage with the 
customers’ production lines, only possible by localizing its factories "wall to 
wall" with the customers’ facilities. This model involves substantial flow of 
sensitive information, which to prevent transactional hazards, Logoplaste 
regulates by a relational system that incorporates: an "open-book" regime, 
providing a global service, the full realization of the investment in fixed 
assets, and the responsibility for the administration of the production lines 
of the client. For each customer, Logoplaste creates a new factory totally 
adapted to the product, process, and pace of the client’s production. In 
addition, even the employees’ contracts and benefits are adjusted to the 
specific customer. This model results in high stability of the relationships 
(e.g., 28 years with Nestlé and Yoplait, 14 years with Coca-Cola and 11 
years with Danone and Unilever). The trust developed with the customers 
favors the replication of the relational model in other markets (e.g. foreign) 
and sustains international expansion. 
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Expansion. The notable international expansion of the three firms 
warrants a short overview of the organizational forms adopted and possible 
explanations. The three firms have differentiated expansion strategies (see 
also figure 2). B&A needs to concentrate production to benefit from using its 
production capacity. This model is hindered by geographic distance, since 
the bottles cannot be efficiently transported to long distances, forcing 
foreign direct investment in manufacturing foreign subsidiaries, such as in 
the recent cross-border acquisitions in Mozambique and the Greenfield 
start-up in North Africa. Given that intra-firm flow of intermediate products 
is unfeasible, the possibilities for inter-subsidiaries coordination are 
insignificant and when the firm wants to serve a market it needs to 
establish its own manufacturing activity by either investing in a new factory 
or acquiring an incumbent firm.  
COLEP also tends to concentrate production, but to a lesser extent and 
only in some activities of the value chain that permit inter-subsidiary 
coordination. Metallic packaging is highly immobile as the international 
trade of some types of metallic containers – such as those for paint or food 
products – is not viable due to the high transportation costs. The 
international expansion seeks: first, to locate proximate to clients, second, 
to permit intra-firm flow of intermediate inputs. Coordination among 
subsidiaries allows COLEP to maximize the utilization of the different 
minimum efficient scales of the production stages vertically integrated. For 
example, lithography has a much larger efficient scale than contract filling 
and thus to maximize the efficient scale in the lithography activity, COLEP 
may efficiently ship the metallic leaves to other subsidiaries.   
The manufacturing of plastic containers has much lower efficient 
manufacturing scale economies making possible the Logoplaste’s model of 
wide geographic dispersion. Logoplaste expands in an idiosyncratic model 
that relies on absolute adaptation of each manufacturing subsidiary to each 
client. The need for coordination among subsidiaries is minimal, and seeks 
mostly to benefit from some procurement economies of raw materials and 
primarily to promote inter-firm transfer of knowledge developed (i.e., 
innovations) in one subsidiary to other subsidiaries.  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The economic structure of advanced nations relies increasingly on 
inter-firm organizational models where specialized firms exchange 
knowledge and goods. While the classical view of firms as legal entities is 
framed within the ‘make or buy’ decision (Coase, 1937), a discussion on 
how independent entities are re-united in interdependent partnership 
models (Holm et al., 1996; Geyskens et  al., 2006; Jacobides & Billinger, 
2006) evidences trade-offs that may lead some firms to internalize value 
chain activities, and others to outsource these activities to external, 
independent firms (Leiblein, Reuer & Dalsace, 2002; Parmigiani, 2007). 
Moreover, different outsourcing models may be employed (Hätönen & 
Eriksson, 2009). This seems incompatible with the transaction costs theory 
of the firm, which argues that integration is necessary to avoid the potential 
for hold-up created when irreversible investments are made. 
However, resolving conclusions on the benefits and perils of 
outsourcing require the analysis of not only the transactions costs involved 
in each exchange, but also firm-specific factors such as the resources and 
capabilities held by the firm, the firm’s ability to establish stable business 
relationships, the stage of maturity of the industry, the firm’s strategic 
intent, and a focus on the economics of the products (Leiblein & Miller, 
2003). That is, a better understanding of how firms govern their 
transactions and ultimately what they manufacture and do not manufacture 
is achieved joining both the TCT and the RBV (Jacobides, 2004; Mayer & 
Salomon, 2006). Therefore, the three cases studied highlight a number of 
issues that possibly emerge in other firms and industries, even if we do not 
aim at generalizing any conclusions, or even test theory driven propositions 
using our cases. The cases serve the purpose of illustrating a complex 
situation, not for testing theory. 
The analysis of the cases shows that all three firms select different 
organizational models, despite the maturity of the industry. However, in 
accord to our first proposition all three packaging firms are outsourced by 
the clients, which is reasonable to suggest that it is a reflection of not only 
the maturity of the packaging industry but also of the strategies that these 
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firms deploy, namely concerning a relational approach to the clients (Lavie, 
2006; Parmigiani, 2007). It is important to note that it is increasingly 
accepted that hybrid forms, such as alliances or stable strategic outsourcing 
models may be viable alternatives to hierarchy when the market fails, and 
to the market (at least in its pure form of buy off-the-shelf behaviors) to 
maintain high performance. The relational governance modes entail an 
informal and trust-based component that requires mechanism such as 
mutual dependence, trust, parallel expectations and joint action and benefit. 
These relationships stereotypically grow out of repeated exchanges between 
partners (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). 
Furthermore, the cases illustrate, in a qualitative analysis, how 
outsourcing relationships may be a solution for exchanges that firms 
organize in such a manner as to involve low transactional hazards. In fact, 
the models adopted by the three packaging firms show low transaction 
costs as a result of firms’ strategies. One firm is bound to a strategy of 
concentration of production in a few locations from which it supplies both 
domestic and foreign markets. This model is driven by the homogenous and 
difficult to differentiate nature of the product and the high minimum 
efficient scale required. Another firm increasingly focuses on the highest 
value added segment ("contract filling") to override location constraints. 
This firm developed a considerable level of vertical integration that rendered 
it a credible partner for the customers’ full outsourcing of the activities of 
certain products. The third firm emphasized its unique organizational model 
in the "wall to wall" supply of its customers, with absolute integration and 
exclusive adaptation to the customer’s manufacturing lines. All three firms 
seem to have developed solutions for maintaining low transaction costs in a 
relationship that is bound by familiarity and trust with their clients. In doing 
so, the three firms have technical competences, internal resources, or 
capabilities, that make them good partners for their clients. That is, all 
three firms assume organization models that, albeit different, respond to 
the outsourcing needs of their clients. 
We discussed how the competitive ability in mature industries is based 
more on obtaining low overall production costs, which may be better 
achieved by stabilizing the relationships with suppliers to avoid the 
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transaction costs in searching, negotiating and contracting with multiple 
vendors. That is, a pure buy off-the-shelf behavior may not be the most 
effective behavior. In mature industries cost-based competition requires 
firms to strive for continuous cost reductions. For instance, in the packaging 
industry, transportation costs of the containers to the client are the major 
barrier to international trade (exports) justifying foreign and domestic 
location concerns by the packaging manufacturers. This is a factor related 
to the economics of the product that stands beyond direct governance 
prescriptions of the two theories reviewed. Two main elements in the 
economics of the packaging stand clear: first, the manufacturing minimum 
efficient scale that permits the multi-location small to medium-sized plastic 
packaging factories, but obliges the concentration in large scale factories for 
manufacturing glass packaging. Second, the transport costs of empty 
containers, as noted above. All three firms entail a reduction of transport 
costs. Although glass containers have higher value than their metallic or 
plastic counterparts, their weight and volume render unviable long distance 
exports and forces B&A to produce closer to customers. COLEP overcomes 
transportation barriers focusing on a strategy that is based on increasing 
the unitary value of its products. The relatively higher unitary value of the 
contract filled products (e.g. full aerosol cans) permits transport at longer 
distances. Logoplaste absolutely eliminates transport costs by locating its 
production facilities contiguous to the clients’ - creating a new factory 
absolutely adapted to each client.  
A number of points can be made from this study. First, in accord to 
extant research, firms in mature industries have, stereotypically, little 
potential to sustain competitive advantages based on their tangible 
resources. The interviews carried out with the owners and top managers of 
the three firms pointed to the importance of the ties and permitted us to 
identify a common denominator: stable partnerships with the clients (see 
also Lavie, 2006; Hätönen & Eriksson, 2009). In mature industries, with 
stable and diffused technologies, the existence of multiple efficient suppliers 
guarantees that opportunism is substituted by trust (Coles & Hesterly, 
1998; Dyer & Chu, 2003; Parmigiani, 2007). Second, this is more 
complicated when the clients are in uncertain environments (which to some 
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degree is characteristic of the consumer goods firms – that are important 
clients of the packaging manufacturers), and the transactions are of the 
recurrent type (Jacobides & Billinger, 2006), as is the case in the packaging 
industry. Third, the nature of the product impacts on the ability to exchange 
in a traditional format and forces firms to search for hybrid formats. Fourth, 
the firms’ strategies may arguably be observable by individual theories. 
Rather, firms compose their organization models attending to the specific 
nature of the industry, products, and clients. Hence, propositions on client-
supplier models need to be contextual, which supports our case study 
approach. Our study thus contributed to better understand how inter-firm 
exchanges are designed and how even medium sized firms may think of 
their business relationships to large multinationals as they seek to 
concentrate on their core activities and competences and expand. 
Combining the TCT with the RBV in examining client-supplier relations 
and transactions in a mature industry is interesting. Note that a central 
tenet of a mature industry is twofold: on the one hand the concern with cost 
efficiency and on the other a possible focus on maintaining some level of 
innovativeness that permits retaining a market share. Contrary to the 
economic rationale of on the spot transactions (or buy off-the-shelf 
contracting) in such industry we found rather stable relationships. The 
transaction costs perspective may partly support this effect insofar as 
strategic outsourcing resembles an insourcing solution. However, it does 
support the RBV prediction. It is therefore important to assess the strategic 
importance of the activity outsourced because it is when these are of high 
importance that both the TCT and the RBV mostly converge to an insourcing 
solution. 
The theoretical views of transaction costs and resource based view (see 
figure 1) do not specifically account for models of strategic outsourcing 
(Venkatesan, 1992; Quinn & Hilmer, 1994) in mature industries. In mature 
industries, it would seem reasonable that firms would prefer more often to 
resort to the market for the inputs needed. Moreover, it would seem 
reasonable that in client-supplier exchanges the client firms would carry 
essentially unstable relationships, and would not commit to long-term 
relationships, but rather would seek occasional suppliers to maximize their 
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own cost-based advantages. However, the cases studied reveal that models 
of strategic outsourcing reinforce both the supplier and the client firms’ 
specialization in their areas of competence (resources), but these are 
balanced with long-term cooperation with complementary agents in the 
value chain. The low transaction costs may then emerge simply because the 
firms are interested in maintaining inter-temporal and inter-spatial 
cooperation. 
It is worthwhile to note that while the RBV and the TCT may be 
complementary (Mayer & Salomon, 2006) they do not offer a unique 
explanation, or prediction, for how firms should organize their inter-firm ties 
in all circumstances (see figure 1). In fact, each theory focuses on either 
the transaction hazards or the value of the resources and the strategic 
importance of the activities. Mismatches are likely to emerge as we noted. 
In these cases, we may benefit from bringing other theoretical perspectives 
into play such as the networks theory and research on partnership models 
(Holm et al., 1996; Geyskens et al., 2006; Lavie, 2006). For instance, when 
the activities are of low strategic importance but the governance hazards 
are high the RBV suggests that the firm should outsource but the TCT 
suggests maintaining the activity in-house. 
Future research 
Future research may evolve in a number of possible paths. One 
possible future research is to consider an alternative view to the TCT and 
RBV based on the social networks research. Networks are intermediate 
governance structures between the market and the hierarchy (Powell, 
1990) whose essence is fundamentally relational, and therefore neither 
based on contracts nor on prices per se. Network theory advises the 
formation of stable and trustworthy outsourcing relationships with selected 
partners (Mollering, 2002; Dyer & Chu, 2003). However, network literature 
is unclear as to what is the impact of transaction hazards, as does not 
consider explicitly the strategic importance of the activity on the 
organizational models. Hence, should firms establish relational exchanges 
when the transactions carry high potential hazards? Should firms outsource 
even if the strategic importance of the activity is high? In fact, it is difficult 
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to discern in which circumstances network literature does not advise 
cooperative relationships. Notwithstanding, the network perspective is 
based on the idea that collaborations ease the access to a variety of 
resources that enhance firms ability to survive and prosper (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977; Coleman, 1988; Hite & Hesterly, 2001), and learn through 
social exchange processes (Rice & Aydin, 1991) to cooperate and coordinate 
their activities (Powell, 1990). Thus, by entering a network of relations a 
focal firm selects which activities it wishes to carry in-house and which it 
outsources. Future research may shed light into these strategic options. 
Future research may also inquire on how the role of networks varies 
along the industry life cycle. In emergent industries it may be that firms 
may be more likely to enter networks to pool resources and jointly influence 
industry standards, and the institutional environment (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Conversely, in mature industries 
entering business networks may be a means to pool resources for 
commercialization and incremental, or competence-enhancing, innovations 
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Notwithstanding, additional research is 
warranted to clarify and verify whether this is the actual case. In this regard 
it may be reasonable to suggest that stable outsourcing relationships would 
be more likely when the activity outsourced was strategically important, 
however in mature industries the strategic importance is more likely to 
reside on knowledge held that permits constant innovations, not on the 
manufacturing of the container. Hence, it may be an interesting endeavor to 
identify whether stable outsourcing models are a strategic option 
particularly relevant for activities of low strategic importance. 
Our study has the usual generalizability limitation that case-based 
studies face. Future  research may test empirically our propositions. 
Perhaps an empirical study may resort to surveys to collect data on 
organizational forms, motivations and a quantitative assessment of the 
transaction costs. It would be interesting to discover inter-industry patterns 
in organizational models that overcome the markets or hierarchies debate. 
Another suggestion has to do with the problem of investment indivisibility. 
It is not always economically viable to create mini-factories, as does 
Logoplaste. Furthermore, while governance models seem related to the 
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level of uncertainty (Coles & Hesterly, 1998) it is unclear what extent of 
uncertainty that may lead to one model versus another. Similarly, it is not 
clear the type of uncertainty that most strongly shapes boundary 
management. Future research may focus on determining how different 
forms of uncertainty adduce differentiated governance models.  
To conclude, the examination of firms’ organization formats needs to 
assess the transaction costs, the resources held by the firm, the state of 
maturity of the industry, and the firms’ ability to retain business 
relationships. It is possible that a social networks perspective may be 
complementary in studying organization forms and thus could be used with 
the TCT and the RBV. We observed that stable business relationships more 
important, perhaps more relevant than spot market exchanges for firms’ 
growth and international expansion. For the researcher this is an interesting 
issue transcending the traditional prescriptions, and encompasses the 
development and exploitation of firms’ capabilities, namely relational 
capabilities. Given that firms’ resources and capabilities co-evolve with 
boundary decisions (Poppo & Zenger, 1998), the actual question may not be 
‘make or buy’ but, as suggested by Kogut and colleagues (1992), whether 
to ‘make or cooperate’ to survive and expand in mature industries. 
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